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Abstract
In recent years there has been observed the phenomenon of employees working long 
hours without been paid. This trend is quite strong during the last fifteen years but there 
is ample evidence that it  is a tendency generated even before. While there have been 
various  explanations  why  employees  work  paid  overtime,  there  is  little  theoretical 
interpretation of working unpaid overtime. This essay tries to analyse critical the existing 
interpretations and add some new explanations. We will try to pinpoint the main reasons 
and explain why this phenomenon takes place especially in three last decades.
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31. Working time in economic theory  
Working time has been a hotly debated issue long ago. Beginning from the very birth 
of the science of economic relations and continuing today it is a theme that justifiably 
draws attention. Of course, the focus of this debate changed from period to period. From 
the end of 19th century till the beginning of the 20th century the main theme was whether 
a reduction of the till then long hours was beneficial or not for the economy. Once this 
was solved presumably in favour of reducing work time and the relevant labour laws 
were established,  there was a widespread conviction that working time could only be 
decreasing. Thus, in the Post-World War II era there were numerous works scrutinizing 
why there is a tendency of working time to be reduced. Generally, we will try to review 
the basic schools of thought in economic relations and provide their analysis for working 
time.
a. Working Time in the Classical Political Economy
To  begin  with,  Classical  Political  Economy,  is  based  on  two  fundamental 
keynotes. First, economic relations are analysed with connection to social relations; even 
the term “Political”  displays  the methodology which is followed. Economy cannot be 
analysed  separately  from Society.  In  particular,  there  is  a  kind  of  agreement  among 
classical  economists  that  social  factors  really  determine,  for  example,   the  level  of 
workers wage (Smith, Ricardo make a distinction between “natural” and “market” wage, 
4highlighting the social factors that determine wages), working time limits and overtime 
premia. 
Second, in this school of thought, there is a deeper notion that describes in what 
way   all  independent economic units are united and synchronised with view to produce 
and exchange with each other; this notion is given by Labour Theory of Value.  Based on 
this  notion,  labour  “value”  interpreted  almost  every  economic  relation.  According  to 
Classical Political Economy, value of products is counted based on the labour embodied 
to them. Therefore, the sphere of exchange is based on sphere of production which is 
determined by labour. Although labour was of big importance in determining the value of 
products, wage determination was not coming from that procedure. Wages and working 
time were formed under physical limits and social circumstances (Smith, Ricardo).
Generally, Classical Political Economy after heated debates draws the conclusion 
that "an acquisitive and hedonistic spirit was innate in humans and high wages would act 
as an inducement, motivating workers to labour both harder and longer"(Nyland 1986). 
Additionally  to  that,   rationality  determines  economic  beings'  total  behaviour;  the 
assumption  of  rationality  is  of  great  importance  in  Classical  Political  Economy. 
Consequently, rationality is a property that describes, for instance, workers’ preferences. 
In our case, free time (leisure time) is of big importance and consequently is contained in 
individuals’ preferences. Leisure time is  seen as a good. Income is also seen as a good 
that  worker  has  to  choose  its  amount.  Leisure  time  and  income  have  a  competitive 
relationship  with  each  other.  To  illustrate  this  point,  workers  either  work  more  and 
receive higher income, or work less and enjoy more free time. Especially Smith argued 
that if workers had the chance to acquire greater income they would work harder and 
5longer. However, there are some workers who prefer leisure than higher income. Through 
this  “sacrifice”  Smith  tries  to  explain  the  behaviour  of  work  time.  Consequently, 
Classical Political Economy views working time as the result of substitution and income 
effect. In conclusion, working time extension or reduction was examined based on these 
perceptions.
b. Working Time and the Factory Movement
Continuing, the Factory Movement with its scholars added a new perception on work-
time debate. More specifically, this Movement, which springs from employees' struggles, 
demanded a legal  maximum in work-time.  Workers,  through their  struggles and their 
conflicts with capitalists, ended up to collective agreements. These agreements contained 
arrangements  about  wages,  working  time,  premia  etc.  Consequently,  working  time 
collective  agreements  gradually  urged  capitalists  and  governments  to  impose  this 
maximum.  Thus,  a  reduction  of  work-time  started  taking  place.  Robert  Owen  is 
considered to be the father of Factory or Co-operative Movement. He maintained that 
there should be workers' control over production, and the means to achieve this goal is 
only by co-operation between them. Moreover, William King was another supporter of 
this  Movement.  He tried  to  implement  these  ideas  by founding a  monthly  periodical 
called  The  Co-operator.  On  the  contrary,  some  scholars  opposed  to  this  movement. 
Especially, Nassau Senior who was one of the most characteristic opponent of Factory 
Movement  pointed  out  that  the  Industrial  Revolution,  which  caused  unemployment, 
facilitated capitalists to lengthen the of working time for the non unemployed. In other 
6words, by introducing new technology in production, a great amount of workers becomes 
unemployed. As a consequence, because of unemployment existence, capitalists press the 
employed workers to accept lower wages, longer hours etc. Concluding, Senior opposed 
to these factory acts, also, by claiming that these acts would eliminate profit and destroy 
industry, because working hours' reduction would reduce output. Therefore, a scientific 
opposition to working time reduction started to be defended.
c. Working Time in the Marxian Analysis  
To this point, Marx contributed outstandingly to economic thought by providing a new 
labour theory of value, which as we will see below provides explanation for working time 
generally. He firstly highlighted the fact that utility value and (exchange) value are two 
different things, without the one determining the other; the former is used to describe the 
utility that one can acquire from a good and the latter is used to describe the necessary 
labour for this good's production. In contrary with Classical  Political  Economy which 
explained production process according to the Value Theory of Embodied Labour, the 
Critique of Classical Political Economy explained it according to the Value Theory of 
Abstracted  Labour.  Generally,  Marx  contradicted  to  the  previous  theory  of  value; 
although he deepened his analysis claiming that value is the socially necessary working 
time for a good's production, not the embodied labour of a concrete worker (Marx 1982).
Generally,  Marx,  by  criticizing  Classical  Political  Economy,  highlighted  basic 
methodological  mistakes  that  lead  to  wrong conclusions.  First,  the  Ricardian  Labour 
7Theory of Value confused surplus value  with one of  its  expressions,  the profit.  This 
comes from Ricardo's mistaken notion about the means of production. Ricardo sees them 
only as “accumulated labour”. In fact, he does not provide any answer to the question 
where  does  profit  come  from,  which  is  fundamental  issue  for  capitalism’s  analysis. 
Second, Ricardo does not understand that prices are never the same with values. Marx 
maintained  that  prices  fluctuate  around  values  according  to  demand  and  supply. 
Generally, prices indicate to capitalists what kind of decisions should they take for their 
production.  Third,  Marx's  criticized  Ricardo's  competition  theory;  because  the  latter 
considered  that  general  average  rate  of  profit  is  formed  automatically.  However,  the 
general average rate of profit is formed through a procedure which contains technological 
change, changes in values and prices, firms’ consolidations or their moving from one 
branch to another, and generally takes time.
The  Critique  of  Political  Economy,  introduced  by  Marx,  is  considered  of  great 
importance,  also because it  reveals  the complicated  social  relationships  of capitalistic 
economy, and highlights that it consist a society of exploitation. In other words, Marx’s 
theory argues that economic relationships spring from an historical procedure; there are 
classes, which are formed through history, especially by conflicts, and struggle for their 
rights and interests. Capitalists'  profits, generally,  are based in the unpaid work of the 
working  class.  For  this  reason,  Marx  claimed  that  capitalism is  ruled  by  the  law of 
Surplus Value. Consequently, the former try to keep the wage in low levels and extend 
the working day and the latter  try  to  increase  their  wages  and reduce working time. 
Workers have developed their own institutions in order to demand in a collective way 
their  own institutions.  Therefore,  in  capitalism  bourgeoisies  have  a  conflict  with  the 
8working class for the latter's wage, for the length of working day etc. In particular, the 
number of hours in a working day is a variable quantity.  Capitalists,  who buy a day's 
labour power, wishing to extract the maximum use value from the purchase. On the other 
hand, workers need to be able to work on the morrow and wish to continue doing so. 
Thus, a conflict arises about the length of working time too. If working class does not 
resist  capitalists'  demands,  capitalists  extend  the  work  period  beyond  its  social  and 
physical limits. If working class demands effectively the reduction of time the working 
day may be reduced. Even in the case in which the working class manages to put a daily 
time limit, capitalists would try to intensify the shortened work in which they resulted. 
This is done through an increase in the speed of existing machines and/or an increase in 
the  quantity  of  machinery  that  workers  had to  operate  or  supervise.  Concluding,  the 
increase or the reduction of working time depends on class struggle. But there are also 
objective limits, and these limits are determined both by physical abilities (as an upper 
bound) and by necessary time for goods’ production (as a lower bound).
d. Working Time in the Marginalist Analysis  
After  that,  the marginalists  came revising some basic assumptions  of the Classical 
Political Economy's. Although for years there was no effort by scholars to use “utility 
value” as a means to interpret “value”, neoclassical economists saw “utility value” as a 
measure of exchange value” (Theocharakis 2005). That is, instead of the Labour Theory 
of Value, they introduced the Subjective Theory of Value. Every commodity’s price is 
determined  by  the  value  which  is  subjectively  given  to  it  by  individuals.  Moreover, 
9economic  relations  according  to  this  theory  are  analysed  by  “methodological 
individualism”;  with  methodological  individualism  “social  interactions  are  finally 
interactions between individuals” (Arrow 1994). In fact they cannot see any difference 
between acting individually and acting collectively.
Another important feature of neoclassical economic analysis is that there is no 
historical  factor  which determines  capitalistic  economic  relations.  In comparison with 
Classical economists, Neoclassical really argue that their theory can be expand to explain 
every  economic  system.  There  are  no  different  economic  laws  in  capitalism  and 
feudalism. For instance, in every system there are individuals who try to maximise their 
utility or their profits.
 In addition, the notion of equilibrium is introduced; individuals enter the market given 
their endowments and after exchange procedures come to equilibrium in which no one 
can become better without someone else's deterioration. An emphasis is given to a static 
distribution of given endowments for a given time (Sraffa 1960).
Generally, marginalists adopted the Classical Political Economy’s idea that people are 
hedonistic spirits who maximize their pleasure subject to their budget constraints. In the 
marginalist  approach,  the  notion  value is  not  used,  as  their  predecessors  of  Classical 
Political  Economy  used  it.  This  analysis  is  based  on  prices,  instead  of  values.  And 
actually they study how prices are determined by demand and supply.  In addition, the 
notion equilibrium consists of a central idea; individuals interact with each other, and 
finally equilibrium is achieved between them.
 In particular, as for the working time, workers are assumed to have some constant 
preferences for their income and leisure time, and according to their constraints maximize 
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their utility; workers are those whose preferences determine whether they choose more 
income or more leisure.  For instance,  when hourly wages increase and there is  more 
reward, workers are motivated to work longer. This is called substitution effect.
      Generally, neoclassical economics, in order to analyse human behaviour, assumes 
that individuals have given their  preferences,  which they are not formed socially,  but 
exist  inside  them,  with  given  capacities  etc.  Based  on that  assumptions,  wages  are 
endogenously  determined  in  a  procedure  that  workers maximize  their  utility  and 
employers their profits, thus they result in an equilibrium, where labour is added up to the 
rest of the means of production, and finally receives what it deserves. Wage is considered 
to be a fair reward.
     In  this  model,  competition  is  intense  enough  to  prevent  any  possibility  of 
exploitation (but in casual trades, competition is generally quite sufficiently intense to 
prevent any possibility of exploitation. Casual labour is often badly paid, not because it 
gets less than it is worth, but because it is worth so appallingly little (Hicks 1963/1932).
 On the other hand, the fact that the worker receives greater reward for every hour 
laboured, the marginal utility of extra income is increased, is called income effect. If the 
substitution effect is dominant, then wages and hours will be positively related. But, if the 
income  effect  predominates,  then  wages  and  hours  will  be  negatively  correlated. 
Consequently, for years working time reduction or working time extension was explained 
by marginalists according to the dominance of substitution or income effects. However, 
nowadays that the phenomenon of unpaid overtime is rising, marginalists face a problem 
in providing arguments and explanations. 
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 Although these schools of economic thought contributed,  rightly or wrongly some 
explanation why the working day was decreasing for a significant historical  period or 
why overtime increased in some cases,  the question 'why unpaid overtime exists and 
gradually  increases'  poses  considerable  explanatory  difficulties  and  thus  it  has  been 
tackled by few scholars in recent years.
   2.  Unpaid  Overtime:  Evidence  from developed  countries  and  the  existing 
theoretical explanations
Generally, during the first centuries of capitalism there was little or no legal protection 
for workers; they were working for 16 hours per day, a lot of children were working from 
a very early age, women had no maternal rights etc. In addition, as it is obvious, there 
was no notion of overtime. Overtime was established as a notion after the first factory 
acts of the 19th century, when legal limits of the working day started to be established. 
Consequently, working time extension is not new in history. In several historical periods 
in the past it occurred that workers had to work more than their contracts. However, after 
the establishment of the legal limits of the working day, the general tendency of working 
time was to be reduced. Moreover, records of unpaid overtime started being kept rather 
recently.  Additional  to  this,  only nowadays  after  a  long period  of  time in  developed 
capitalistic  countries  working  time  started  increasing  again.  Furthermore,  not  only 
working  day  is  increasing  but  also  we  can  observe  rising  unpaid  overtime.  Unpaid 
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overtime does not characterises only some sporadic cases, but is present and significant in 
wide areas of the economy.
a. Detecting Unpaid Overtime 
To begin with, Schor (1991, 1999) was the first who observed the increasing working 
time after years of reduction in a research for American economy. In particular, overtime, 
as a way of working time extension, was observed that is increasing too. Not only paid, 
but also unpaid overtime boosted during three last decades. She pointed out the fact that 
leisure in US has been squeezed in a tremendous degree : Americans work 158 hours 
more per year -which means nearly an extra month of work each year- based on data 
from 1969 -1989 (Schor 1999 p.2). In addition, Golden and Figart (2000) found that in 
the US working hours per year have increased 4% since 1980 (p.16).
Thus,  debate  on  work  time  ignited  again.  Bell  and  Hart  (1999)  added  some  new 
evidence about working overtime in conjunction with above findings. Moreover, Bell et 
al. (2000) based on data from both UK and Germany analysed the phenomenon of both 
paid and unpaid overtime. They concluded that overtime working is more prevalent in 
UK than in Germany (paid/unpaid), and that in both countries, paid overtime working is 
more common among manual workers, while unpaid overtime is more prevalent amongst 
managers  and  professionals.  Additionally,  Anger  (2005)  provides  evidence  from 
Germany proving that paid overtime hours are declining, but unpaid have the opposite 
tendency.
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Moreover, various scholars revealed the existence of unpaid overtime for the countries 
mentioned above ( Campbell &Green (2002), Booth et al. (2003), Pannenberg (2005), 
Anger (2005), Bratti & Staffoliani (2007) ) plus Sweden ( Meyer & Wallette (2005)), 
Switzerland (Engellandt & Riphahn (2005)), Netherlands (Glebbeek & Van der Lippe 
(2004)) and Australia (Drago, Black, Wooden (2005)). 
Most  of  these  works  analyse  the  phenomenon  of  unpaid  overtime  depending  on 
variables  such  as  the  level  of  education,  experience,  sex,  marital  status,  union 
membership, immigration, age, existence of debt, self employed/private/public sector. 
The main conclusions derived from these empirical tests are that:
− white  collar  workers  or  workers  with  higher  education  demonstrate  a  kind  of 
persistence in working unpaid long hours (Pannenberg 2005, Anger 2008),
− males work more long hours than females (Bell et al.2000), 
− unionised workers or workers in more unionised countries do not work unpaid 
overtime or work less unpaid hours in comparison with those that are not unionised (Bell 
et al.2000), 
− workers with short tenure also work unpaid overtime (Anger 2008) and also their 
unpaid overtime tends to be equal with paid (Bell et al.2000). 
− Moreover,  the majority  of  these scholars agree that  this  phenomenon is  much 
more apparent and persistent in workers employed in services and the tertiary sector, than 
in the secondary sector. However, this does not mean that manufacturing workers are not 
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subjected in this working time extension. Golden and Figart (2000) show that overtime 
hours have reached a record level in manufacturing (pp 16).
− Moreover, Hetrick (2000) argues that during the economic expansion of the 1990s 
employers in manufacturing industries were more likely than in previous recoveries to 
increase overtime hours among existing employees than to hire new workers (p.30). 
− In addition, unionisation in these surveys is a variable with a disputable impact; in 
some cases serves to reduce working time and increase overtime, but in some other cases 
it reduces overtime hours (Bell and Hart, 1999). 
− Furthermore, overtime varies among groups of workers; unskilled workers exhibit 
lower overtime, but skilled workers higher (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999). 
− Also, unpaid overtime has been observed to be higher among temporary workers 
than among permanent by 60% (Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005). 
Generally,  increasing  unpaid  overtime  has  been  detected  by  all  of  them  with 
convincing evidence. Furthermore, these projects display a variety of results. Although 
most of them agree about the existence and persistence of unpaid overtime to certain 
groups  of  workers  (mentioned  above),  they  differ  in  their  results.  Sometimes  it  is 
concluded that  unpaid  overtime  has  positive  results  as  for  future  earnings,  but  some 
projects prove the opposite. One thing that can justify this deviation is that for different 
countries different methods are followed (data collection, sample examination) but the 
most important thing is that there is poor evidence for unpaid overtime considering the 
fact that no firm will provide statistical services with such data and few are the workers 
who speak about their unpaid work. 
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The majority of existing literature is based only on testing this phenomenon by using 
mainly full-time workers;  but  workers in  the public  sector,  in  agricultural,  fishing or 
private households, self-employed persons and respondents with missing information on 
wages, standard and actual hours worked, overtime hours and overtime compensation are 
dropped. The most characteristic example of the previously mentioned empirical work is 
Pannenberg (2005), who proves that there is a positive relation between unpaid overtime 
and  future  earnings,  claiming  that  unpaid  overtime  is  not  actually  unpaid  but  an 
investment that a worker can do, based on the sample mentioned above. However, his 
results can be disputed if we take into consideration those of Anger’s (2005) and Meyer 
and  Wallette  (2005),  because  they  prove  that  there  is  no  deferred  compensation  for 
working long hours. Moreover, in Anger's empirical analysis (2008) these categories of 
workers are excluded too; full time workers in the private sector are the main group of 
testing. Generally, there are few counterarguments regarding this sample collection, due 
to the fact that this group of workers is the most characteristic and proper to result in 
conclusions.
Full  time workers  in private  sector  may be considered the most  characteristic  and 
representative part of workers. On the contrary,  full  time jobs in recent years tend to 
diminish, and gradually part time jobs are on ascending. Consequently, full time workers 
are a crucial group and indeed verify such a tendency of the working time, but on the 
other hand we should not neglect the fact that we mentioned above; namely that part-
timers are increasing. At this point, we have to bear in mind the whole labour market 
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deregulation that took place during last decades and converted the proportion of full time 
jobs to part time. Especially, during the 1980s decade, with USA and UK being pioneers, 
institutional changes determined significantly labour market.  We will try to analyse it 
below and provide more evidence.
 Under these circumstances, unpaid overtime started being observed more intensively 
since those days. Till that period, economic analysis was focused on questions such as 
that why working time has a tendency to be reduced. Since the early 1990s, this question 
was reversed,  because the opposite tendency was taking place more and more.  Schor 
(1991) highlighted the fact that Americans are overworked, and that there has been a big 
increase in working time. Later on, the initial evidence of unpaid overtime was reported 
and the first questions about what causes this fact arise (Bell & Hart (1999), Pannenberg 
(2005)). 
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Since this phenomenon has been observed various explanations have been put forward 
to  explain.  There  has  been  an  effort  of  listing  the  theories  of  the  unpaid  overtime's 
existence and its gradual rising. As we mentioned above, unpaid overtime has inadequate 
theoretical explanation in mainstream economics due to the fact that has been observed 
relatively recently but also because of their very constitutional elements.
b. Classifying Theoretical Approaches for Unpaid Overtime
We will try to classify theories in two main groups: 
   Firstly, one classification that can be done is based on the acknowledgement that 
unpaid overtime is useful in production and contributes in output and profits. Thus, there 
are three main groups of theory based on this assumption:
i) unpaid overtime and deferred compensation,
ii) unpaid overtime interpreted by human capital theory, 
iii) unpaid overtime as coverage of a non Pareto Optimal external imposing. 
    However, some scholars defend the fact that unpaid overtime is not entirely useful in 
production, but it  can be interpreted as a behaviouristic device between employer and 
employee. Therefore, this group of approaches can be classified as follows: 
iv) unpaid overtime as gift exchange and
v) unpaid overtime as signalling device.
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I) Unpaid Overtime and Deferred Compensation Theory  
First and foremost, we will analyse the first approach: unpaid overtime and deferred 
compensation. This theory maintains that workers provide unpaid labour hours in order to 
increase  overall  output.  It  is  based  on  the  theoretical  assumptions  of  neoclassical 
economic  approach.  Labour  is  an  input  in  production  which  receives  a  wage, 
corresponding to the effort which was spent. Moreover, capital is an input too, and profits 
come from capital returns. In this case of unpaid overtime, it is argued that in fact it is not 
compensated, because workers in the future can be awarded with higher earnings or other 
benefits.  When the  increased  output  will  provide increased  profits  for  the  firm,  then 
workers’  wages  will  be  increased  too.  Pannenberg  (2005) maintains  that  the  term 
“unpaid” overtime is not appropriate to describe this phenomenon; he argues that from 
the employee’s point of view these hours he spent on working may seem unpaid, but 
from the economic point of view these hours are finally paid in the future. It is claimed 
that present and future (from economic aspect) are substitutes, for this reason even if a 
worker  is  not  compensated  immediately  after providing  long  hours,  he  will  be 
compensated  in  the  future  with a  potential  promotion or  wage increase.  Moreover,  a 
similar survey for the UK was carried out by Campbell and Green (2002) proving that an 
extra unpaid hour over 1991 to 1995 raised 1996 pay by 4%, an extra paid hour by 1%. 
Therefore, they conclude that labour still receives what it has invested, which is one of 
the most fundamental notions of neoclassical approach. 
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II) Unpaid Overtime and Human Capital Theory  
Another approach which is put forward to interpret the phenomenon we analyse is the 
human  capital  theory.  Generally,  this  theory  -  which  also  is  based  on  neoclassical 
assumptions about labour - considers labour as an input, and knowledge or education as a 
factor  that  improves  it.  Acquisition  of  knowledge  and education,  as  tools  that  equip 
labour, is considered human capital acquisition. That is, individuals who potentially work 
acquire  human  capital  through  formal  education  which  is  provided  to  them.  This 
acquisition is seen as an investment. Education in that schema is considered an input that 
contributes to production. 
This  approach  applies  to  cases  that  substitution  effects  are  dominant  rather  than 
income effects. In other words, an employee with high level of education would work 
long hours in order to increase his return in human capital investment. If we specify it in 
the case of unpaid overtime, education or knowledge can be acquired while an employee 
is working. Consequently, working long hours are seen as an investment too and used to 
raise individuals’ productivity. Gradually, workers who have “concentrated” a stock of 
human capital will be rewarded (Booth et al. (2003)). Substitution of providing future 
more than present work has more dominant effects than income effects i.e. staying in job 
within  contractual  hours  and receiving  an  analogous  wage.  As  we  can  observe,  this 
approach  does  not  go  far  from  the  notion  that  labour  finally  receives  its  award 
corresponding to the effort which was spent. 
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III) Unpaid Overtime as a Pareto Improvement  
The third theory attributes the existence of unpaid overtime to a Pareto Improvement. 
First of all we should refer to the assumptions on which this third approach is based. As 
we  mentioned  above,  this  model  is  based  on  neoclassical assumptions  (with  some 
deviations). Labour is seen as an input too in production procedure. However, in this 
model, markets bare little relation with the typical Walrasian centralized market, where 
labour  demand  and  labour  supply  are  met  determining  wage  and  employment,  but 
workers and firms meet each other in a decentralised market with view to match their 
preferences. It is still  based on the neoclassical assumptions that there is an aggregate 
production function,  employers  maximize  their  profits  and  employees  their  utility 
function. 
  In this model, workers and entrepreneurs bargain with each other, and in that way 
they determine optimal wage, optimal working time limits and optimal working overtime 
premia.  However,  institutions  (Governments,  Unions,  Agreements)  are  exogenously 
introduced  and  change  this  optimal  outcome  of  bargaining.  Consequently,  the 
phenomenon  of  unpaid  overtime  occurs  in  order  to  cover  this  inefficiency  that  was 
caused  by  these  exogenous  factors;  in  this  case,  inefficient  overtime  premia,  which 
happen  to  be  higher  than  efficient  ones,  lead  employers  and  employees  to  a  new 
arrangement. In this arrangement, the latter offer more hours of work in order to satisfy 
the equilibrium conditions, therefore higher overtime premia are weighted by long hours, 
and efficiency is achieved (Bell & Hart 2000, Trejo 2001). Again in this approach labour 
receives what has already contributed in terms of Pareto Efficiency.
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IV) Unpaid Overtime as a signalling Device  
According to this theory, unpaid overtime is seen as a signalling device: by working 
long hours the employee may signal to his employer that he or she is of high value. To 
make it clear, it is argued that incomplete information is responsible for market’s failure 
to be efficient. In some cases basic assumptions of General Equilibrium do not hold, such 
as the hypothesis of perfect information. Then Adverse Selection problem appears where 
agents have imperfect information about products’ or individuals’ quality. Then, in order 
to avoid a potential market failure agents can use some device to solve the inefficiency 
caused. Signalling is based on the axioms of Imperfect Information Dynamic Games. At 
each information set the player with the move must have a belief about which node of the 
information set has been reached by the play of the game (for a non sighted information 
the belief  is  a probability distribution),  given their  beliefs  players’  strategies  must  be 
sequentially rational (Gibbons 1992). Sequential rationality consists of a strategic profile 
for each player, with which he maximizes his utility given his beliefs for the game.
    In order to solve this inefficiency that was caused by imperfect information, players 
of the game send messages to provide information. One of the devices used is signalling, 
which means that individuals who are active in a market try with various means to show 
their quality and provide some information to other individuals. For signalling there is a 
sender and a receiver. 
    In this case, when there is lack of information by the employer for the quality of the 
employee, the employee can show if he is of good or bad quality by the amount of unpaid 
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overtime he offers. Employee is the sender and the employer is the receiver. In existing 
literature,  separating  equilibria  have  been  used  to  describe  this  kind  of  situations:  in 
equilibrium distinct types of employees choose distinct strategies; high ability workers 
can afford working more unpaid overtime, while low ability workers cannot. Thus, the 
firm  finally  gives  benefits  to  high  ability  workers  (Meyer  &  Wallette  (2005), 
Anger(2008)). Unpaid overtime, according to this approach, does not serve productive 
reasons (every single unpaid hour does not contribute to output increase), but functions as 
a detective device for an employer to recognize the employee’s ability and productivity. 
This theory is described as presenteeism or absenteeism in work. 
   This particular model was adapted by Akerlof (1970), who describes ways of solving 
Adverse Selection problems with asymmetric information,  and by Spence (1973) who 
specified it in labour market. More specifically, this model is based on assumptions such 
as:
 - the existence of many identical potential firms that can hire workers, 
- each firm produces the same output
- using an identical constant returns to scale technology 
- in which the only input is labour, 
- the firms are risk neutral and seek to maximize their expected profits and 
- act as price takers (Mass-Collel & Whinston and Green 1995).
 In this classification, screening tactics of employers to recognise employee's quality 
can  be  also  considered.  Unpaid  overtime  has  been  tested  as  a  screening  device by 
Engellandt and Riphahn (2004) for the Swiss case. Screening is an other detecting device 
which can be implemented in cases of imperfect information.  However, in this model 
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screening is not used by employees but by employers to detect employees' “quality”. In 
this  case,  the sender is  the entrepreneur  and the receiver is  the worker, while unpaid 
overtime is a screening device. 
V) Unpaid Overtime as a Gift Exchange  
There  are  also  some  approaches  which  try  to  attribute  economic  phenomena  to 
behaviouristic interpretations, or to some particular jobs. To illustrate this point, there are 
theories which present unpaid overtime as an exchange of a gift between a worker and 
his employer as a reward to higher wages or other benefits.  However, this perception 
consists  of  a  “work  devotion  schema”  (a  worker’s  devotion  to  his  employer)  and 
indicates some behaviour rules for the workers. Sometimes,  one can include it  in the 
“ideal worker norm” approach. It can be said that it is a kind of marketing policy from 
employer's  side,  and  the  worker's  gift  is  “work in  excess  of  the  minimum standard” 
(Akerlof, G A 1982).
Other approaches for unpaid overtime:
Furthermore,  there are views which associate unpaid overtime with the  uncertainty  
over a task completion (Bell & Hart 2000). In complex tasks there is uncertainty about 
when a job finishes. Thus some workers may have to provide more labour hours than 
their contract determines. In other words, there are some jobs which are rewarded per 
output and not per hour; lawyers, managers and generally some professions that provide 
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services. Consequently,  if a concrete task cannot be completed in time (due to various 
reasons) usually employees have to prolong their working hours in order to finish it. For 
these  reason,  this  uncertainty  over  task  completion  can  lead  to  working  unpaid  long 
hours.
In  addition,  there  is  an approach which connects  a  leadership  worker  with unpaid 
overtime; workers with leadership roles may work more unpaid overtime, due to the fact 
that  when  enterprises  organize  workers  into  teams,  leaders  often  cover  the  task 
completion of the less productive workers who did not manage to fulfil it. Consequently, 
leading workers tend to work unpaid overtime in order not to loose their reputation or 
future benefits (Bell & Hart 2000).
 However,  these  analyses  are  used  in  order  to  explain  some  sporadic  cases;  they 
concern  some  certain  professions  and  cannot  provide  justification  for  rising  unpaid 
overtime  in  the  whole  economy.  Moreover,  the  same  uncertainties  or  the  same 
professions  existed  thirty  years  ago,  before  this  phenomenon  being  observed in  such 
degree. In conclusion, the fact of collectively rising unpaid overtime in - at least- the 
most  developed  countries  (USA,  UK,  Germany,  Australia,  Netherlands,  Sweden, 
Switzerland)  has  to  be interpreted  in  terms  of  analysing  a  social  ,  and  in  particular, 
economic  phenomenon,  and  not  interpreting  it  individualistically  and  referring  to 
sporadic cases.
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3. Critique of the proposed analyses
All these five explanations of unpaid overtime however have significant explanatory 
deficiencies. For this reason, we will try to examine them critically.
I) Unpaid Overtime and Differed Compensation Theory  
Regarding the first approach, which maintains that unpaid overtime is deferred 
compensated,  there  is  a  lacuna  in  justifying  how workers who are  not (for  example) 
promoted are finally paid for the extra working time they have offered.
Firstly, is everyone who works unpaid overtime being compensated in the future? 
Finally, only few of the employees will be compensated with future benefits. Especially, 
in cases of a subsequent promotion; among all workers who compete with each other 
only one or at least few of them will be promoted. Therefore, the rest of the workers will 
receive  nothing.  However,  they  have  already  offered  unpaid  work  hours,  and  have 
already contributed to their entrepreneurs' profits. Thus, an inefficiency arises and doubts 
can be cast on the fact that finally everyone receives what he has contributed.
   Secondly, it depends on whether the firm makes profits or not, if workers will be 
finally rewarded. In the case that the firm does not increase its profits, employees will 
never be paid despite the fact that they worked unpaid long hours.
   Third, all these future earnings that employees receive are their total “cummulative” 
(Pannenberg 2005) contribution to output (or to profits)? Doubts can be cast also on this 
fact.  Even if everyone is finally rewarded in some way, there is no confirmation that 
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employees will receive what they really produced. For example, 1 hour contribution per 
week results  in  the  long run  in  2% increase  of  earnings  ceteris  paribus  (Pannenberg 
2005).  However,  for  the  entrepreneur  this  “hour”  may  be  crucial  for  his  profits 
maximization; usually, employers acquire higher percentages of profits increase than, for 
example, 2%. Consequently, in those cases workers under no circumstances receive their 
additional contribution. In other words, further research has to be done with view to find 
out whether future earnings represent the real value of working long hours in comparison 
with profits earned.  On the contrary,  Anger (2005) shows that from 1993 to 2004 in 
Germany, unpaid overtime hours cannot be seen as an investment, due to the fact that 
there is little evidence for future wage growth and promotion, and in fact do not help to 
prevent future lay-offs. 
   For the above reasons and examples, the theory of deferred compensation has both 
analytical  and  empirical  lacunae  that  incapacitate  its  explanation  of  unpaid  overtime. 
Therefore, in no way this approach can justify convincingly that finally there is no unpaid 
overtime by economic perspective.
II) Unpaid Overtime and Human Capital Theory  
     Regarding the human capital theory, we can only but highlight the fact that labour 
has  different  characteristics,  than  a  simple  input.  First  of  all,  we should refer  to  the 
distinct role of labour as a commodity in capitalism, due to the fact that the worker sells 
his labour force in order to receive a wage. It is different from other commodities, firstly, 
because  of  the  fact  that  the  entrepreneur  pays  to  worker  his  wage  after  his  labour 
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spending. On the other hand the rest of commodities are paid before their use. Thus, an 
employee selling his labour power is depended on his employer's wills. When a buyer 
acquires a new product, he knows that the product will behave as a product, but when a 
buyer acquires a new worker (labour has the form of commodity, but does not behave as 
a typical commodity), is not necessary that he will complete the concrete task. Moreover, 
labour has social  and collective characteristics.  There are certain  historical  and social 
procedures which formed a distinct  economic system that  turned labour power into a 
commodity. Additionally, we cannot neglect the fact that labour in capitalism has been 
socialized. That is to say that people, in comparison with previous ways of production, 
work in big groups producing goods; they are connected within this procedure and one 
need other's work in order to complete a task. Consequently, workers interact with each 
other. Generally, labour cannot be considered as a simple input in the production process, 
because of the fact that the other elements which are involved in this process – land, 
machinery, row materials- cannot have an equal and self-contained role. In fact, they are 
motivated by human labour.
   Furthermore, regarding the human capital theory a similar critique, as in theory of 
deferred  compensation  can  be  applied.  Finally  everyone  is  compensated,  by  having 
acquired  knowledge about  their  jobs  and receiving  higher  wages  in  the  future?  Both 
theories (deferred compensation and human capital) at the end imply that in fact there is 
no unpaid overtime, because working long hours is finally being paid. We will not cite 
again  the  same  arguments  which  consider  that  everyone  is  finally  compensated  (see 
above),  because  not  every employee  is  awarded for  his  investment  in  knowledge by 
working long hours, or they do not receive their  real  contribution to profits.  Another 
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argument which arises contradicting this approach is that unpaid overtime is not only a 
phenomenon of newly entrant workers in a certain profession, but extends to a wide age 
range. Little can we demonstrate for the fact that this phenomenon is major in young ages 
or in employees with little job experience. However, in almost every empirical research 
unpaid overtime concerns every age group and every group with different experience (in 
a smaller or bigger degree). It is more likely that new entrants work unpaid overtime, not 
because they “want” to acquire new knowledge, but due to the fact that they are of a 
sensitive group of workers, and in order to remain in their jobs cannot easily react to a 
working contract's violation by their entrepreneurs.
III) Unpaid Overtime as a Pareto Improvement  
Analysing this approach, the same critique can be applied for the assumption that 
labour is considered a simple input in production procedure. Especially,  in this model 
where  workers  have bargaining  power and there  are  laws which  impose  “externally” 
wages and premia.
   Moreover, workers’ preferences are not fixed and stable; they have been formed 
through  this  historical  procedure,  and  still  “preferences”  are  subjected  to  changes, 
depending on social  factors  or  technological  improvement.  When,  new technology is 
available in production, their “preferences” for wages or working time limits adjust to 
this new level of technology, leading them demand, for example, lower working time 
limit, due to the fact that the same amount of task can be completed in less time. 
29
In  addition  to  these,  wages  which  in  this  model  are  considered  to  be  determined 
endogenously,  in  fact  they are  determined  by the  historical,  social  and  technological 
factors  too.  For  instance,  when a  new technological  accomplishment  is  introduced in 
production and labour productivity is raised, workers have the demand to increase their 
wages. Due to the fact that in the same amount of working time the output and have been 
increased. Consequently, their demands will be adjusted according to new circumstances. 
For the above reasons and examples, workers cannot be considered as individuals who 
maximize their utility with given preferences, but social beings who have a contact with 
the social reality.
 Additionally to the fact that as was mentioned above labour has social characteristics 
workers  form  a  distinct  as  separate  class  according  to  their  position  in  the  way  of 
production.  Consequently,  they  form a  social  class  and  because  some  of  them have 
realized  this  fact,  in  order  to  defend  their  rights  have  formed  collective  groups  of 
demanding them. Thus, collective bargaining starts. 
Therefore,  collective  bargaining  cannot  be  considered  an  exogenous  process  that 
imposes inefficient wages or overtime premiums, because always it was a part of the 
production's process. For this reason, institutional factors or collective agreements cannot 
be analysed as exogenous factors. As we mentioned above, despite that production has 
been socialized,  profits  are individualized and are taken by those who own means of 
productivity,  the  capitalists.  Under  these  circumstances  worker  and  employer  begin 
bargaining from very distinct  and unequal positions.  In other  words,  this  relationship 
between them has little equal characteristics; the entrepreneur owns means of production, 
but the second owns his labour power, the first one holds a job position and the second 
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one demands this job, the employer in a case of no filling this job faces lower profits, but 
the employee in this case faces unemployment. For the employer the filling of this job 
position is important for the existence and the growth of his firm, but for the employee 
this  job is  important  for his survival.  Thus,  they begin bargaining from different  and 
unequal positions. 
This bargaining takes place in a social  environment  that  has been formed (through 
years and with various changes and conflicts) with institutes and generally with political 
factors that determine in a lot of cases economy too. These unequal positions, which are 
expressed in the field of economy,  can be as well expressed in the field of institutes; 
entrepreneurs  have  the  holy  right  of  individual  property  protected  by  laws  and 
constitutions, but workers do not have any right of social property. They have just some 
certain  rights  which  have  vested  through their  conflicts  for  working  time  maximum, 
social  insurance,  minimum  wages  etc.  Therefore,  this  unequal  position  is  reinforced 
more, when we take into consideration under what circumstances this “bargaining” takes 
place. 
In addition, even if there is some degree of liberty from the employee's side before 
signing the contract– disagreement on the contract and search for another one better-, this 
liberty does not exist when he starts working after bargain's establishment.  He cannot 
bargain in an individualistic  base due to his  restricted power. Even if  he does so, he 
cannot achieve outstanding outcomes, because it is easy for an employer to fire him and 
hire another. Only with collective bargaining may demand higher wages, higher overtime 
premia and working time reduction.  However, this gets more difficult  if  we take into 
considerations that not in every job workers are covered by unions.
31
But  even  if  we  analyse  the  phenomenon  in  terms  of  Pareto  Efficiency,  then  this 
argument  cannot  really justified  the existence  of working unpaid ling hours.  In other 
words,  Pareto  Improvement  would  be  the  situation  that  everyone’s  position  becomes 
better and no one is worse. Despite this, employer's position becomes better and worker's 
worse because he sacrifices his leisure without receiving compensation. Concluding, this 
model  offers  a  weak  explanation  for  the  recently  increasing  phenomenon  of  unpaid 
overtime;  neither  preferences  are  exogenously given,  neither  wages  are  endogenously 
determined, neither collective agreements can be considered exogenous, nor the employer 
can be analysed as an equal person with the employee.
IV) Unpaid Overtime as a signalling Device  
    As for this approach, signalling is used as a complement to the above mentioned 
theories in order to explain the existence of unpaid overtime for non productive reasons. 
Based on the assumptions of this model, we will try to see how this model can really be 
applicable to reality. Firstly, we can observe that signalling theory is very restrictive on 
its  assumptions.  As  for  the  assumption  that  workers  maximize  their  utility  given 
employer's strategies, the same critique has to be done as in the third (III) approach. 
An additional argument that one can have against the use of game theory in that kind 
of economic analysis, is that workers or entrepreneurs do not always have a strategy i.e. a 
complete plan which will respond to every potential. Consequently, sequential rationality 
is not appropriate tool, and analysing unpaid overtime as a device in a game deduction. In 
real world, not every firm produces the same output level. It cannot be used even for 
32
simplicity, because in the real economy nowhere this has been observed. It is an arbitrary 
abstraction.  And  that  is  exactly  the  substance  of  competition  between  firms;  firms 
compete with each other due to different outputs and profits.
Moreover, output level is an important factor of decision-making for the production 
process, including the amount of labour that is going to be used, the working time and 
wages. In other words, output level and profits that are acquired by its selling make firms 
become more or less competitive; hire or fire employees, increase the working hours or 
not, introduce new technology or not etc. We cannot take as constant the output level of 
firms. 
In addition, labour cannot be seen as a simple input in the production as we mentioned 
above. Labour is the element that activates the whole production process. On the other 
hand,  every  production  unit  does  not  need  only  labour;  machinery,  buildings,  row 
materials  etc.  are also necessary for a firm to exist.  Also, an employer  does not take 
decisions about his production based only on the amount of labour he needs, but also on 
the amount of, for example, machinery. Or, for instance, if there is a new technological 
improvement, entrepreneurs may consider to introduce it in their production, under the 
condition that this is profitable.  In consequence, the assumption of labour as the only 
input is very simplistic unrealistic.
Furthermore, the technology which is used is not always known by employers. This is 
a very fundamental assumption of neoclassical economics, which unfortunately does not 
apply in real economy.  Even in the cases that production function is known, it  is not 
taken into consideration for the decision making of each firm.  Moreover, in this model, 
technology does not present always constant returns to scale. In other words, there is an 
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increase in output analogous with the increase of inputs that insert in production process. 
This assumption is not applicable in reality, since few or unknown are the firms with such 
a technology. Therefore, it can be said that this model is becoming more simplistic and 
unrealistic.
 Finally,  the  fact  that  this  model  is  based  on  perfect  competition  makes  it  more 
vulnerable to stand on reality’s test. A perfect competitive market nowhere and in no time 
had existed.  And this  assumption  is  fundamental  for  signalling  theory,  especially  for 
separating equilibria; all of the results that the employee cannot pretend another quality, 
that the low ability worker will act as high and the low as low ability worker are proved 
with the assumption of zero profits (Spence,  1973). In fact,  markets  are not perfectly 
competitive and employers  earn positive  profits.  If  they did not earn positive  profits, 
there would be any incentive for employers to produce. Consequently, all these firms try 
to acquire market power, and if fact all economies are characterised by -what neoclassical 
economics argue- imperfect competition. In real economies, there is market power which 
is concentrated in few firms (in a smaller or bigger degree), and those firms are not price 
takers; even in the terms of neoclassical analysis, there are monopolies and oligopolies 
which  determine  prices.  For  these  reasons,  signalling  theory,  which  is  based  on  the 
assumption  of  zero  profits,  has  a  fundamental  weakness  to  defend the  existence  and 
augment of unpaid overtime. 
In addition, there is a lacuna in explaining the use of workers’ ability. This approach 
argues, that staying long hours in job has no productive use, but only informative one. 
Even in the case that one worker has more physical or mental capabilities for working 
long hours, but these abilities play no productive role, then there is no use in this method 
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of acquiring useless (for the production) information. By using signalling in order to send 
information,  a  lot  of  precious  effort  is  wasted  inefficiently.  Consequently,  a  new 
inefficiency  is  created,  while  it  was  used  with  view  to  solve  a  previous  one.  Also, 
worker’s ability cannot be observed only by his long work, but from other things during 
his participation in production, while working in the limit of contractual hours. Unpaid 
overtime is not a good tool to solve existing inefficiency.
Apart  from that  even the empirical  analysis  in some projects  (Anger 2008) do not 
prove the fact that unpaid overtime can act as a signalling device. Especially, it has been 
shown that in West Germany there is a positive signalling for the workers, but negative in 
East  Germany.  In  the  same  project,  human  capital  theory,  theory  of  deferred 
compensation  and  gift  exchange  theory  are  tested  but  were  not  found  “capable  of 
explaining earnings differentials between workers” (Anger 2008). In addition, Meyer and 
Wallette  (2005)  do  not  find  evidence  for  future  benefits  from  working  overtime. 
Especially, they tested whether overtime has an effect in the transition from a temporary 
jobs to open-ended jobs, and if this signalling device leads to any positive result, but they 
conclude that  “absenteeism had,  in general,  no effect  on the probability of exiting to 
either a permanent job or to unemployment” (Meyer & Wallette 2005).
V) Unpaid Overtime as a Gift Exchange  
      As for the approach that interprets unpaid overtime as a gift for the good behaviour 
of employer, in fact it cannot be characterised clearly economic. If we go further we may 
find more  ways  that  an employer  can extract  unpaid work.  In  this  case,  we have  to 
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consider that conflict between workers and entrepreneurs does not only have economic 
and political form, but also an ideological one. In other words, when we analyse people 
who belong to social groups (e.g. a class), we have to bare in mind that they interact with 
each other and through their  conflicts  they can change their  opinion,  and adapt  ideas 
which are in fact in contrary with their interests. For example, in our case management, 
as a knowledge field, has been developed in a high level. Techniques and strategies of 
manipulating employees have been introduced and improved by their employers.
  Consequently,  employers can “convince” their employees, by giving them various 
reasons  and incentives,  to  work  unpaid  overtime.  One  of  these  incentives  may  be  a 
higher-than the average- wage, pleasant working environment,  more leaves from their 
work  etc.  Therefore,  by  using  these  incentives,  the  employee  can  feel  “obliged”   to 
correspond to these offers, by providing for example unpaid overtime. But, generally, this 
approach as it  was mentioned above cannot provide any economic explanation of the 
rising phenomenon of unpaid overtime, except if we consider management improvements 
the main factor which determines this phenomenon. However, even in that case, there 
must  be a  deeper  answer to the question why employers  give such an importance to 
management and what they call 'human resources administration”, and this answer can 
have its roots in economic interpretations.
 Furthermore,  in  all  these  theories  there  was  no  answer  to  the  question  why this 
phenomenon of unpaid overtime is rising in recent years. No answer for this fact has been 
given in existing literature. In some cases, this highly debated issue of working time is 
analysed, for instance, with respect to changes in the production organisation; Engellandt 
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(2004) refers to the post-fordist organisation of economy as an important factor which 
leads to this phenomenon. However, there is a general absence in the existing literature of 
providing an explanation and giving an historical perception to working time extension, 
and particularly unpaid overtime, that takes place in recent years.
4. Working time extension and Unpaid Overtime: potential explanations  
 In this section, we will follow an analysis based on the foundations of Marxist theory 
of working time. For the reasons and examples mentioned above, we cannot but take into 
consideration  that  society  consists  of  classes  with  opposing  interests,  but  not  of 
individuals  who  maximize  their  utility.  Each  class  is  determined  by  its  position  in 
production procedure; those who own means of production are capitalists, and those who 
work on them and receive a wage are workers. Profits, in fact, do not come from the 
sphere of exchange, but from the sphere of production. To illustrate this point, profits 
come from the unpaid labour of worker. That means that the working day is divided in 
two  parts:  the  first  part  is  called  necessary  working  time  and  the  second  additional 
working time. Worker receives a wage equal with the labour he spent in the first pat, and 
the second part consists of surplus value that is taken by employers. Consequently, profits 
come from each worker’s surplus value. That is to say employers want to maximize their 
profits by adopting new technology, extend working day, reduce wages etc., but workers 
try to resist  and impose  their  interests  for higher  wages,  working day reduction,  less 
intensification of production etc.
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Moreover, labour is not an input like any machinery, but it has a special role: labour is 
what gives value to products. To this point we have to make a distinction between labour 
and labour power; labour power is the physical and mental capabilities of a worker, but 
labour is the whole procedure, with which humans intervene to nature in order to fulfil 
their  necessities.  Labour  power  however  in  capitalism  has  been  transformed  into  a 
commodity.  Consequently,  labour  power  is  what  receives  a  wage,  not  labour  as 
neoclassical economics defend. Also, during a working day, only a part is paid to workers 
with the form of wage, and the rest is unpaid labour with which worker has produced 
surplus-value. Surplus-value, generally, comes from the unpaid part of working day, in 
which workers have produced new values (commodities). By the procedure of extracting 
surplus value capitalists have profits. Consequently, they try with various means to get as 
much as they can. 
 Furthermore,  capital  in  this  analysis  is  not  a  restricted  notion  as  in  neoclassical 
economics. Capital is considered to be “value that creates surplus-value” (Marx 1982) , 
and  consists  of  all  these  values  that  participate  in  production  process.  Additionally, 
capital consists of the amount of money that capitalists use to buy i) factories, buildings, 
technical equipment, row materials and ii) labour power. The first is named constant and 
the second variable capital. The new value produced through the combination of constant 
and variable capital is surplus-value. 
Generally,  employers  try to extract  as much surplus-value as they can,  in order to 
maximise their profits. There are two ways by which surplus-value can be extracted. This 
can be achieved by
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i) either expanding the whole working day, while necessary working time is kept 
constant, and worker's wage remains constant too. This is called absolute surplus value 
extraction, because the whole working day has been prolonged. 
                                                      8 hours
               4 hours necessary work           4 hours surplus work
             --------------------------------- + ---------------------------
                                                       10 hours
               4 hours necessary work                    6 hours surplus work
             --------------------------------- + ----------------------------------------.
ii) or by keeping working day constant, despite the fact that  necessary working time 
has  been  decreased  (either  due  to  new technology or  due  to  improvement  of  skilled 
work). This is called relative surplus value extraction,  because the increase of unpaid 
working time has been relatively increased.
                                                  8 hours
             4 hours necessary work          4 hours surplus work
            -------------------------------- + ---------------------------------
                                                  8 hours
            3 hours necessary work            5 hours surplus work
             -----------------------+ -------------------------------------------       
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We can express the above situation in formal type:
   T = V + S   (1)
where: 
T: total daily work-time 
    S: Surplus-value (unpaid work-time)
     V: the value of labour power (paid work-time)
     which implies that:
      S = T – V   (2)
and   s'=S/V  (3) is degree of surplus value or degree of exploitation.
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More specifically,  during  the  production  process  the  extraction  of  surplus-value  is 
related to (1) the duration of labour,  (2) the intensity of labour and (3) the technical 
conditions  of  production.  During  the  income  distribution  process  the  extraction  of 
surplus-value is connected to (4) the correlation between the value of labour-power and 
its price (wage) (Ioannides & Mavroudeas mimeo).
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In our diagram line AB depicts equation (1), which is the total working time (T). Let 
us begin from the situation that T = 8 hours, and under some given technical and social 
conditions necessary working time is V1  =4 hours and additional working time (unpaid 
working time) is S1=4 hours. This point is depicted by letter K. The slope of the line from 
the beginning of axes till  point K (OK) is s'= S1/V1=4/4=1, and reflects the degree of 
exploitation.
Here, in the case of an increase in relative surplus value, we move towards line AB, to 
a new point I, where there is less necessary working time V3  = 2, and unpaid working 
time is S4=6. Here, the slope of the line (OI) is s'= S4/ V3=6/2=3.
Now, if we take the case of an increase of absolute surplus value, we move in another 
line A'B', which represents an increase in total working hours, for example T=10. In this 
case, surplus value extraction has been increased (S2=6), due to the fact that necessary 
working time remains  the same (V1  =4).  Consequently,  degree of exploitation  s'= S2/ 
V1=6/4=1.5.
Therefore, the extraction of relative surplus-value has a limit, and cannot be increased 
without  constraints,  because  a  minimum  wage  has  to  be  paid  to  the  worker  for  his 
survival.  Thus,  when  employers  have  to  maximise  their  profits  but  technology,  for 
example, restricts their capacity for relative surplus value extraction, result to prolong the 
whole working day, and finally extract absolute surplus value. 
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Unpaid overtime is the case of absolute surplus value extraction. Capitalists prolong 
working time - by violating a labour contract - while the necessary part remains constant. 
Workers' wage remains constant, while they remain in job and produce output. 
Moreover,  capitalists  are interested  in maximising  their  profits  comparing  with the 
capital which is at their disposition, or generally make decisions according with the rate 
of profit, which is the ratio of profits over capital: 
        (4)
 where p is rate of profit, s are profits, c is stable capital and v is variable capital. And, 
if we analyse it further, by dividing with variable capital: we can observe that it consists 
of two important ratios:
  (5)
i) S/V is the rate of surplus value or rate of worker's exploitation. This shows the 
proportion of profits that were earned to the workers' wage.
ii) C/V is the organic synthesis of capital. This ration shows how much stable capital 
is used in the production in comparison with variable.  For example,  in a car industry 
more money are spent for technical equipment than for workers' wages, but in a clothing 
industry the opposite. Therefore, organic synthesis of capital is higher in the first industry 
and lower in the second.
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Generally,  due to the fact  that  there is competition between capitalists,  in order to 
increase their profits, introduce new technology in their production. Therefore,  in the 
long run, employers’ competition leads to a generalised technological adaptation in  by 
all production units in the economy. And as a consequence, the ratio C/V is rising, which 
finally leads to the falling of rate of profit ( p ) (see equation 5).  
This falling tendency of rate of profit leads finally to 1973 economic crisis. In this 
diagram (Harman 2007), we can observe the evolution of net rates of profit last 50 years. 
We see that generally rate of profit has a tendency to fall through all these years (USA, 
Germany, and Japan). 
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Moreover, in the diagram below, we can see US profit rates accounting for (—) and 
abstracting from (- ) the impact of financial relations (Harman 2007).
    Consequently, employers, in order to equalize this tendency of falling rate of profit 
(p), due to increasing organic synthesis of capital (C/V), try to increase rate of surplus 
value (S/V). 
After providing the assumptions on which we will be based on, we will try to list the 
factors which lead to this phenomenon in recent years:
− Changes in organisation of production,
− introduction of informatics, 
− increasing tertiary sector of economy, 
− deregulation of  labour market and 
− weakening of trade unions are seen as the most important factors which made 
unpaid overtime phenomenon rising in recent years.
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i) Changes in the Organisation of Production – Capitalist Restructuring
There is a contradictory enhancement of tendencies of concentration and centralisation 
of capital. Whereas under the pressure of crisis the average firm has tended to become 
more  “lean”   there  was considerable  increase  of the  weight  of constant  capital  (both 
because of the wage reduction and new technologies introduction). Organic composition 
of capital increased leading to falling rate of profit. This was the main cause of 1973 
crisis  according to Shaikh & Tonak (1994) and Dumenil & Levy (1993). 
On the one hand the centralisation of capital increased , through waves of merges and 
acquisitions. On the other hand, however, it increased the sub-contracting of peripheral 
activities;  there  was  a  centralisation  of  all  the  critical  processes,  whereas  secondary 
activities were sub-contracting but under the almost direct control of the central  firm. 
Therefore, essential control was restricted to even fewer centres and sub-contracting, in 
the  cases  that  resulted  to  a  proliferation  of  the  operating  firms,  are  more  or  less 
appendages of the central firm (Mavroudeas 1999). 
Generally,  this  re-organisation  of  production  was  based  firstly  on  making  small 
enterprises (in contradiction with those huge factories of the past), with which capitalists 
can eliminate fixed costs. And secondly, after the creation of small enterprises and the 
elimination of fixed costs, the amount of workers that are necessary has been decreased . 
Therefore, a certain task is undertaken by less workers. By this way there has been an 
intensification of labour. Additionally to this,  working time extension is taking place. 
Employees work long hours in order to complete the task that have undertaken. For this 
reason we observe unpaid overtime in this period of time.
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     ii) Technological Improvement, Introduction of Informatics and Unemployment
Technological improvement plays an important role in production; new technological 
implementations can be adopted in the production, and increase workers’ productivity, 
and finally profits, because in the same amount of time workers produce more output. 
This  fact  may lead  employers  either  to  fire  workers  or  to  keep the same number  of 
workers with the same wage (which in fact reduces their wage per hour). In the first case, 
an employer can take advantage of it, because an increase in unemployment functions as 
a  pressure  mechanism  for  employed  workers  to  accept  their  employers’  conditions. 
Therefore, unpaid overtime may be imposed by entrepreneurs with view to increase their 
profits without any additional cost of their employees’ working long hours. The existence 
of unemployment,  especially this  one caused by technological  improvement  acts  as a 
mechanism of pressure to employees to work unpaid long hours. 
However,  unemployment  always  existed,  therefore  one  can  wonder  why  this 
phenomenon of unpaid overtime happens in recent decades. In our case, at the late 70's 
and early 80's informatics development and their introduction in production was the main 
technological and scientific factor that changed in a degree capitalistic production. After 
the  1973  crisis,  profitability  and  growth  rates  are  faltering  (Shaikh  &  Tonak  1994, 
Dumenil & Levy 1993). The labour and production process is changing towards the so 
called flexible labour as we will see below. 
The introduction of information technology plays  a significant  role since enhances 
capitalist control of the labour process. In consequence, it is achieved an increase in the 
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rate of exploitation. At the same time it enables vital economies in the use of constant 
capital. In this sense, flexible labour represents an outstanding restructuring of the labour 
process.  Consequently, by flexible labour there is a new balance between relative and 
absolute surplus value. During recent years absolute surplus value extraction has been 
strengthened (Mavroudeas 1999). One direct method is altering total labour-time. In this 
case, we can observe it by working time extension and especially by unpaid overtime. 
 However,  introduction  of  informatics  is  not  responsible  for  changing  the  whole 
architecture of capitalism, like many scholars argue with the Theory of New Economy. 
According to “Solow Paradox” (Solow 1987),which has proved that although there has 
been a great investment in informatics technology, this led only to an extremely small 
increase in productivity of labour. In fact, the sphere of production changed in a small 
degree.  However,  the  sphere  of  exchange  adopted  to  a  bigger  degree  these  new 
technological  accomplishment.  Services  changed in  a degree  with the introduction  of 
information  technology,  but  in  manufacturing  not.  In  service  sector,  information 
technology  was  adopted,  especially  in  administration  and  logistics;  great  tasks  are 
undertaken by a smaller  number of workers, and consequently there is an increase of 
intensification of labour.  
iii) Secondary and Tertiary Sector of the Economy
  Generally,  inter-temporal technological introduction  (not particularly informatics) 
had also a result in labour force translocation from one sector of economy to the other. 
All  this  technological  introduction  and  these  changes  in  organisation  of  production, 
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especially in service sector, determined the fact that working time extension takes place 
especially in these kind of professions.
Moreover, as a lot of scholars mentioned above, the unpaid overtime phenomenon is 
more prevalent in skilled than unskilled labour. This fact can be easily justified if we take 
into consideration that in unskilled labour workers are restricted by their physical limits. 
Working time cannot be easily prolonged and the surplus value cannot be easily extracted 
too.  For this reason, we can detect  unpaid overtime to be more prevalent in skilled than 
in unskilled labour, as scholars argue above.
     iv) Deregulation of the Labour Market
Generally, when capitalists face their falling rate of profit, as it was mentioned above, 
they do not only try to implement new technology or introduce new organisation methods 
in their production but also to  implement new policies for their profits to increase. In 
particular,  after  1973  crisis  and  after  years  of  Keynesian  policies'  implementation, 
employers  cast  doubts  on  state’s  intervention  to  market  affairs.  Consequently,  new 
measures were at need to be implemented and new policies that could make profits arise. 
These new measures should bare little relationship with those of the past. Consequently, 
by using their power and affecting governments, a new policy of markets' liberalization 
started  to  take  place.   This  liberalization  could  not,  but  include  labour  market  too. 
Generally,  deregulation  of  working  relations,  especially  since  80's  decade,  has  taken 
place  widespreadily.  For  this  reason,  working  time  extension  and  especially  unpaid 
49
overtime should not  be examined separately from the whole deregulation of working 
relations. 
Pioneers in this labour market deregulation were UK and United States. Initially, the 
effort of making working relations more lax began with the implementation of laws and 
acts that restrict labour unions' bargaining power. In England this was expressed with 
Thatcher's  '80,  '82,'84,  '88,  '90  and  '93  employment  and  trade  union  acts,  in  which 
gradually unions' power was weakened (e.g. Strikes could easily announced illegal and 
abusive, government had the right to intervene in unions' internal procedures) and finally 
workers' vested rights were abolished (e.g. Lower minimum wages, increased working 
hours and lower benefits due to the weakened bargaining power of workers). In addition, 
semi-employment was increasing due to these working laws' introduction. Generally, a 
new notion was created to describe this deregulation, Thatcherism, which was implying i) 
less  state  intervention  in  markets  ii)  privatization  of  till  then  public  sector  and  iii) 
entrepreneurial-ism,  which  means  providing  incentives  to  employers.  The  same 
procedure took place to US with the famous Reaganomics; ( by Reagan's government) 
economic  measures  that  made working relations  more  relaxed and were appealing  to 
entrepreneurs  too.  At  the  end,  Canada,  Japan  and  Sweden,  Denmark,  Iceland  and 
gradually the rest of European countries adopted the same measures.
Moreover, labour unions participation to economic policy-making, as for employment 
legislation,  was  reduced  significantly.  For  instance,  Crompston  (1995)  analysed  this 
participation from 1970-1993 in German, Italian, France and UK economies, where it is 
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proved that there is a correlation between participation of labour unions and influence on 
policy's  implementation.  Especially,  for  these  countries  which  mentioned  above,  a 
relatively high participation till  early 80s changed to a lower one afterwards. In some 
cases, this participation became negligible in periods of conservative governments. 
 In  addition,  there  have  been  efforts  by  various  scholars  to  correlate  labour's 
deregulation with the existence of  right or social-democratic governments, and the power 
the left wing. For example, Juan Botero et al. (2003) have examined 85 countries and 
finally found that  the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labour 
regulations and more generous social security systems. It is also shown that socialist and 
French legal  origin countries  have sharply higher  levels  of labour  regulation  than do 
common law countries,  and  the  inclusion  of  legal  origin  wipes  out  the  effect  of  the 
political power of the left. Generally, it is commonly justified that political circumstances 
are not separated from countries' economies; they affect and/or determine to a larger or 
smaller scale the sphere of economy, not only national one but also international. For this 
reason, our analysis  would be incomplete  if  we did not include these new conditions 
under which working relations formed and transformed.
Furthermore, we can focus on working time extension generally can be consider the 
major issue that we should analyse. Unpaid overtime is one part, the illegal one, of this 
extension.   In other words, in recent years there is a big effort to extend working time 
limits, through employment legislation, especially in Europe. A lot of recent examples 
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can testify this fact such as the 35-hour work, work-sharing, flexicurity, the distinction 
between active and inactive working time. 
Firstly,  in France recently 35 hours working week was established by government. 
Although there was legislation,  this law is observed to be substantially weakened and 
exceptions  have become established.  Secondly,  by ‘working-sharing’  programmes,  an 
agreement  between workers and employers  can be arranged as for the working time. 
Thus, a potential result is the shortening of the working week to about three days and the 
paying  of  reduced wages.  In  addition,  Social  Insurance  offers  some compensation  to 
employees for the time that they are unemployed. However, there are some scholars that 
disprove these work-sharing effects. For example, Andrews et al. (2005) contradict the 
perception that a shorter work-week will lead to more jobs (work-sharing). In their panel 
data analysis find that a cut in standard hours lowers the proportion of overtime workers 
in a plant and increases the proportion of standard time plants. That means that work-
sharing had contributed to an increase of working time.
Thirdly, the new definition of ‘flexicurity’ ( the term was firstly has been introduced 
by the  social  semocratic  Prime  Minister  of  Denmark  Poul  Nyrup  Rassmussen  in  the 
1990's). The term flexibility effectively encompasses two different models, on the one 
hand ‘numerical flexibility’, i.e. the idea of easier to hire and fire contracts as well as 
‘functional flexibility’, closely linked to the concept of ‘knowledge society’ or ‘lifelong 
learning’  (LLL),  whereby  the  European  workforce  is  being  prepared  for  a  changing 
working  life,  where  only  a  multitude  of  skills  (polivalency)  will  ensure  employment 
(Crouch, 1999). In order to describe i) workers’ flexibility and adaptation, ii) rights’ and 
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obligations’ equalisation,  iii)  working force’s mobility,  iv) hiring and firing flexibility 
and v) constant workers’ training. This new invented notion indicates the type of new 
employee that is needed in new economic circumstances, especially by European Union 
which create this notion.
Last but not least, the recent debate about the distinction of working time in ‘active’ 
and 'inactive' and the fact that working week can reach 65 hours enhances the concern for 
this  topic.  European Union Council  after  December  2008 voted this  instruction to be 
given  to  member-states  and  followed  by  them.  “Active”  working  time  is  finally 
considered this part of working time where employee produces output, and “inactive” this 
part where worker is not considered to produce, but he is still available for working for 
his employer. 
Generally, as we can see above, there are institutional changes which concern working 
time.  Consequently,  our debate  should not  contain  only unpaid overtime,  but  general 
working time extension. In other words, overtime is usually used to express the hours 
worked  further  than  a  contract  determines.  However,  recently  there  is  an  effort  (see 
measures  which  were  mentioned  above)  to  make  these  contracts  more  flexible.  That 
means that the notion unpaid overtime tends to be extinguished, because is going to be 
“legal” and be contained officially in labour contracts.  
     v) Labour Unions 
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Additionally, we cannot but include in our analysis another important subjective factor 
that determines significantly economy,  labour unions. As we mentioned above, labour 
unions cannot  be considered an exogenously given variable  in our analysis  about the 
route of working time during history.  Conflicts  between working class and capitalists 
have formed and determined wages, working time limits  and premia,  social  insurance 
etc.;  based  on  technological  progress  or  on  social  circumstances  changes,  workers 
demands are changing, varying and developing.   Working class consists of the majority 
of  economically  active  population,  especially  in  developed  economies,  and  through 
history has created its own institutions to demand their interests, as mentioned above. 
Workers formed union, not only in their specific industry, but also coalitions in the whole 
economy. Each of these unions and groups are united or synchronised in a way, having 
impact not only on wage formation and working time limits in their industry, but also in 
the whole economy.
For years,  we can observe,  working time going decreased;  generally  working time 
reduction was included in demands of workers. Definitely, it does not mean that working 
class and labour unions suddenly excluded from their demands working time reduction 
recently,  we see its  rising. We can only but speak about a weakness of “bargaining” 
position of trade unions and a strengthen that of the employers. This can be shown by the 
decline  in  trade  union  membership,  especially  in  three  last  decades,  for  example  in 
Europe (this decline is especially strong in the new member states), and more specifically 
in these countries which were mentioned above. In particular, union density in the EU 
declined  from 32.6% to 26.4% between 1995 and 2001,  in  the  EU-15 union density 
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decreased  from  31%  to  27.3%  and  in  EU-10  from  42.7%  to  20.4%  (European 
Commission 2004a:18)13. But we can also observe it by the data offered by International 
Labour Organisation (ILO). This weakening of bargaining power has its consequence on 
working time extension and particularly in rising unpaid overtime.  In 1977, according to 
USA data, over one in five union members had collective bargaining agreements that 
restricted  mandatory  overtime,  according  to  the  QES.  But  as  many unions  have  lost 
membership, in particular those in manufacturing and communication industries, workers' 
bargaining power to obtain such contract  provisions may have diminished (Golden & 
Jorgensen 2002).
 Trade unions do not only play an important role in the whole economy, but also a 
particular one in each industry and sector. A wide range of scholars can justify this role. 
For instance, in the book 'Unions and Collective Bargaining in a Global Environment' 
(World Bank Group, 2003) it was mentioned that “workers who belong to unions earn 
higher wages,  work few hours,  receive more training,  and have longer  job tenure on 
average, than their non-unionised counterparts”(Ebbinhaus 2004; European Commission 
2004a).   Apart  from  that,  scholars  who  study  unpaid  overtime  have  found  that 
participation in unions increase workers’ possibilities of receiving overtime premia (Bell 
et al. 2000). 
Therefore, taking all above into consideration, union weakening is responsible too for 
the whole deregulation of labour  market.  Union density is  a very important  index of 
workers'   bargaining  power.  Accompanied  with  all  these  laws  and  acts,  which  were 
13Maarten  Keune, Collective Bargaining and working time in Europe: an overview,,
http://www.etui.org/research/Media/Files/CB_WorkingTime/CB_WorkTime_Chap1
55
implemented for first time in 80s decade and officially restricted union centralisation and 
participation  in  States'  administration,  we are  led  to  this  situation  today.  The  unpaid 
overtime phenomenon generally springs from restricted bargaining power of unions too.
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Union density %, Data from ILO (International Labor Organization)
Union Density Australia Germany Italy Japan Sweden
1970 44,15 32,03 36,97 35,1 36,5 67,73 28,92 44,79 27,43
1971 45,39 32,13 39,73 34,57 36,23 70,05 29,17 45,27 26,95
1972 46,33 32,37 41,79 34,31 36,62 71,36 28,87 46,18 26,26
1973 47,23 32,43 43,32 33,47 36,24 72,45 28,65 45,46 23,54
1974 48,8 33,75 46,22 34,26 36,05 73,54 28,96 46,43 23,17
1975 50,06 34,58 48,05 34,53 37,76 74,47 32,34 48,26 21,64
1976 50,23 35,11 50,46 33,7 37,12 73,88 33,81 49,42 21,61
1977 49,06 35,24 49,8 33 37,18 76,03 33,05 51,09 23,16
1978 49,48 35,54 50,41 32,6 37,01 77,03 32,52 51,78 22,42
1979 49,87 35,3 49,71 31,76 36,59 77,31 31,89 51,61 23,4
1980 49,9 34,9 49,58 31,15 35,28 78,02 31,11 50,68 22,34
1981 49,24 35,15 48,03 30,89 33,5 78,35 30,3 50,54 21,01
1982 47,96 35,02 46,69 30,57 32,78 78,95 29,75 48,72 19,69
1983 50,9 35 45,52 29,75 31,28 79,64 29,55 48 19,45
1984 50,24 34,9 45,31 29,22 29,97 80,77 29,03 47,53 18,23
1985 48,96 34,67 42,49 28,79 28,75 81,28 27,57 46,22 17,45
1986 45,06 33,92 40,38 28,19 27,32 82,51 26,33 44,81 17
1987 41,16 33,33 40,05 27,71 24,85 82,42 25,82 44,46 16,52
1988 41,15 33,11 39,81 26,94 24,7 81,45 25,2 42,58 16,25
1989 41,13 32,41 39,38 26,13 25,1 80,69 24,76 40,61 15,86
1990 40,5 31,22 38,81 25,37 25,45 80,02 24,32 39,32 15,45
1991 39,87 35,99 38,66 24,78 25,6 80,07 22,65 38,45 15,47
1992 39,53 33,86 38,87 24,5 25,18 82,91 23 37,22 15,15
1993 37,55 31,82 39,22 24,34 25,87 83,86 22,92 36,12 15,14
1994 34,67 30,38 38,73 24,25 25,63 83,73 23,29 34,16 14,92
1995 32,58 29,22 38,07 23,97 25,66 83,14 22,85 34,08 14,32
1996 31,01 27,75 37,36 23,4 25,09 82,75 22,86 33,19 14,02
1997 30,26 26,98 36,23 22,79 25,05 82,19 22,59 32,05 13,55
1998 27,91 25,94 35,69 22,53 24,53 81,29 21,72 31,55 13,4
1999 25,45 25,57 36,08 22,18 24,56 80,63 20,96 31,44 13,37
2000 24,55 25 34,92 21,54 23,12 79,08 19,38 31,22 12,83
2001 24,25 23,53 34,85 20,88 22,5 78,03 17,77 30,73 12,84
2002 22,93 23,22 33,96 20,26 22,09 78 18,21 30,41 12,62
2003 22,93 22,91 33,06 19,64 21,68 78 18,65 30,09 12,4
Netherlan
ds
Switzerlan
d
United 
Kingdom
United 
States
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5.  Conclusions
Working  time  was  always  a  very  important  part  of  economic  analysis.  Till  now 
scholars were trying to explain the causes of working time reduction. However, in recent 
years  the  opposite  tendency  appeared.  Working  time  is  observed  to  be  increased. 
Consequently, all these schools of economic thought which argued that working time can 
always  decrease  face  a  theoretic  deficiency.  In  particular,  not  only  working  time 
extension appeared, but also the phenomenon of unpaid overtime. 
These  theoretic  deficiencies  stimulated,  especially  mainstream  economics  to  find 
some  new  approaches  for  the  explanation  of  this  phenomenon;  theories  of  differed 
compensation, human capital,  Pareto Improvement and  Signalling emerged to explain 
unpaid overtime. Every theory mentioned above is based on assumptions of neoclassical 
economic analysis. In our critique, we do not only detect an analytical lacunae, but also 
an empirical one. Every approach analyses labour as a simple input in production process 
and neglects its social character. Moreover, every of these theories avoid to cast doubts 
on  the  basic  neoclassical  assumption  that  labour  wage  is  the  reward  of  labour 
contribution generally. 
Following the foundations of Marxist analysis, we argue that working time extension 
generally and unpaid overtime particularly are forms of absolute surplus value extraction. 
In addition we observe this phenomenon especially in recent years for some particular 
reasons. The falling tendency of rate of profit, which led to the economic crisis of 1973, 
pressed  capitalists  to  implement  radical  changes  in  production  process;  changes  in 
production organisation, to introduce informatics technology in the sphere of exchange.
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 Additionally to them, the developing tertiary sector of economy are structural factors 
which  facilitated  capitalists  to  extract  more  surplus  value.  Furthermore,  the  so called 
capitalist  restructuring,  which  was  described  above,  was  also  accompanied  by 
institutional changes too; the labour market was also deregulated having its impact on 
working time extension, that we can observe nowadays. 
Moreover, unions weakening took place during last years due to previous structural 
changes, social and historical reasons. This fact led workers to a situation with  restricted 
bargaining  power.  Consequently,  employees  cannot  demand  effectively  a  possible 
working  time  reduction  or  to  rewarded for  the  labour  which  have  offered.  All  these 
factors played a determinant role in working time extension and particularly in the rising 
phenomenon of unpaid overtime.
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